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1 
The Parts of Your Vehicle
In	 an	 operation	 like	 ours,	 the	 suppliers	 will	 make	 you	 or	
break	you.1
Motor vehicle producers are among the world’s most recognizable 
brands.	Thanks	to	elaborate	marketing,	nameplates	like	Ford,	Toyota,	
and	Volkswagen	are	familiar	to	consumers	around	the	world.	Consum-
ers	 are	 attracted	 to	 the	 ruggedness	 of	Ford,	 the	 reliability	 of	Toyota,	
or	the	style	of	Volkswagen.	Yet	the	driving	experience—comfort,	per-
formance, and reliability—primarily is not set by the company whose 
name is on the dashboard, but by the hundreds of suppliers of the vehi-
cle’s parts.
Think about the radio in the center console of your vehicle. A vehicle 
is put together from hundreds of components like the radio. These com-
ponents range from pistons and cylinders to door handles and steering 
wheels. And a radio, in turn, consists of many individual parts, such as 
knobs and wires and sensors, not to mention nuts and bolts and screws. 
Disaggregating a vehicle in this fashion reveals a highly complex sup-
ply chain involving thousands of parts and almost as many individual 
companies. 
The motor vehicle industry is composed of two types of manufactur-
ers:	assemblers	and	parts	makers.	First,	a	handful	of	assemblers,	usually	
referred to in this book as carmakers, put together vehicles at several 
dozen	final	assembly	plants	in	the	United	States.	Second,	several	thou-
sand parts makers, usually referred to in this book as suppliers, produce 
the roughly 15,000 parts that go into the vehicles (Australia Department 
for Environment and Heritage 2002). 
Until the late twentieth century, U.S. carmakers produced most of 
their own parts themselves and dominated the suppliers of the parts that 
they	did	purchase	(see	Chapter	2).	In	the	twenty-first	century,	responsi-
bility for making many parts has been passed to independently owned 
suppliers. Several thousand companies, employing more than 670,000 
workers, produce several hundred billion dollars worth of parts every 
year for new vehicles assembled in the United States. 
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“The motor vehicle supplier sector has become the backbone of the 
motor vehicle assembly industry, employing . . . substantially more than 
the number of people employed by the assemblers” (Hill, Menk, and 
Szakaly	 2007).	About	 186,000	workers	were	 employed	 in	U.S.	 final	
assembly plants in 2007, compared to approximately 673,000 in parts 
supplier plants (Table 1.1). The true ratio of parts to assembly employ-
ment was even higher than three to one because more than one-fourth 
of the parts purchased in 2006 came from overseas factories, and those 
workers were not included in the comparison.
The total value of all of the parts delivered by Tier 1 suppliers to 
final	assembly	plants	averaged	$13,600	per	vehicle	in	2006,	compared	
to	$11,100	in	2000,	an	increase	of	22.5	percent	over	six	years	(Merrill	
Lynch 2007). In comparison, the average expenditure on a new car in-
creased	only	10.0	percent	during	that	period,	from	$20,600	in	2000	to	
$22,650	in	2006	(Ward’s	Automotive	Group	2007).
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THE BOOK
The motor vehicle parts industry has been changing geographi-
cally as well as functionally. This book analyzes the linkages between 
changes in the auto industry’s geography and structure. It raises the 
level of understanding of how the industry is organized by providing 
analysis at a much richer level of detail than has been provided in previ-
ous studies. 
This	book	has	two	major	purposes.	The	first	is	to	describe	the	key	
characteristics of parts suppliers, which account for the largest and 
increasing share of the value added in manufacturing motor vehicles. 
The analysis relies heavily on data collected concerning several thou-
sand parts plants in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The second 
principal purpose is to describe the changing geography of U.S. motor 
vehicle production at local, regional, national, and international scales. 
The book explains that these spatial changes have resulted from chang-
ing relationships between carmakers and their suppliers.
An industry that was once heavily clustered in Michigan has been 
dispersing to other states, as well as to other countries. In the mid-twen-
tieth century, three-quarters of all parts were made in or near Michigan; 
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in	the	twenty-first	century,	only	one-quarter	come	from	there.	Between	
2000 and 2007 alone, Michigan’s employment in the motor vehicle 
parts industry fell by 43 percent, from 227,000 to 129,000. Yet, at a 
regional scale, the U.S. motor vehicle industry is still heavily clustered, 
in a region—known as Auto Alley—that lies in a north–south corridor 
between	the	Great	Lakes	and	the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	
Parts are made by two kinds of companies, original equipment man-
ufacturers (OEMs) and aftermarket suppliers. Original equipment man-
ufacturers make parts for new vehicles, and aftermarket suppliers make 
replacement parts for older vehicles. Original equipment accounts for 
about 70 percent of total parts sales and the aftermarket about 30 per-
cent	 (Office	of	Aerospace	and	Automotive	Industries	2007).	The	dis-
tinction between the two groups is not always clear-cut because more 
than one-third of the 100 largest OEM suppliers also rank among the 
100 largest aftermarket suppliers, but for the most part, the two sectors 
of the motor vehicle industry remain distinct (Automotive Aftermarket 
Suppliers Association 2007; Automotive	News 2007a).
This book is concerned with OEM suppliers, which have vary-
ing characteristics. Some of them are multibillion-dollar enterprises, 
whereas others are very small. Some have been around for more than a 
century,	whereas	others	were	created	in	the	twenty-first	century.	Some	
are family owned, and others are controlled by venture capital.
Employment (000) Share (%)
Carmakers








Total parts suppliers 672.5 78.4
Table 1.1  U.S. Assembly and Parts Employment, 2007 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).
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What nearly all parts makers share in the eyes of the motorist is 
invisibility. If consumers like a vehicle, the carmaker gets the credit. If 
it is disliked, the carmaker is blamed. Even auto industry insiders know 
little about most of the parts makers. Numerous histories have been 
written about carmakers, as well as about their founders and leaders. A 
search of any good-sized library or online retailer will turn up hundreds 
of	books	just	on	Henry	Ford	and	the	Ford	Motor	Co.	A	similar	search	
will reveal that little if anything has been written about the vast majority 
of the parts companies discussed in this book.
Consider, for example, the best-selling car in the United States in 
2007, the Toyota Camry. Two-thirds of the value of the Camry was 
added not by Toyota but by independent suppliers. The motor vehicle 
industry’s principal newspaper, Automotive	 News, depicted some of 
Toyota’s	several	hundred	Camry	suppliers	 (Figure	1.1).	Several	were	
Japanese-owned companies with close historical links to Toyota, such 
as the wire harness supplier Yazaki and the spring supplier NHK. But 
consumers attracted to a Japanese car with a well-earned reputation for 
high quality may be surprised to see how few of the parts were actually 
made in Japan or by Japanese companies.
The parts in a 2007 Camry represent a veritable United Nations 
of	ownership,	including	British-based	shaft	supplier	GKN,	Canadian-
based	hinge	supplier	Cosma	(now	Magna),	German-based	ABS	brake	
supplier Robert Bosch, and Swedish-based airbag supplier Autoliv. 
Venerable	U.S.-owned	 corporations	were	major	 contributors	 as	well,	
including hose supplier Dana, valve supplier Eaton, interior supplier 
Lear,	and	paint	supplier	PPG.	Other	parts	makers	highlighted	in	Figure	
1.1 are themselves multinational joint ventures, such as American–Jap-
anese exhaust supplier Arvin Sango and seat supplier Trim Masters, and 
German–Japanese	sealing	supplier	Freudenberg-NOK.
The suppliers mentioned in the two previous paragraphs all are 
ranked among the largest in the motor vehicle industry, each with annu-
al sales in the billions of dollars. Other Camry suppliers are more mod-
estly sized, generating revenues only in the tens of millions of dollars, 
for example, stabilizer bar supplier Brewer Automotive Components, 
headrest	supplier	Gill,	and	oil	filler	cap	supplier	Miniature	Precision.
When	 the	Ford	F-150,	 the	best-selling	 truck	model	 in	 the	United	
States, was redesigned in 2004, it too had a mix of large and small do-
mestic-	and	foreign-owned	suppliers	(Figure	1.2).	Although	the	F-150	
The	Parts	of	Your	Vehicle			5
was a truck made by a U.S.-owned company and the Camry a car made 
by a Japanese-owned company, the two models had some of the same 
suppliers.	Not	only	did	the	“Japanese”	Camry	and	the	“American”	F-
150 share leading U.S.-owned suppliers such as Dana, Dura, and Lear, 
they	both	had	brakes	and	lights	supplied	by	leading	German	suppliers	
Robert Bosch and Osram Sylvania, respectively.
Suppliers to these two best-selling vehicles differed in two key 
aspects.	The	 leading	F-150	 supplier	by	 far,	Visteon	Corp.,	was	not	 a	
major	Camry	supplier.	Among	Visteon’s	many	contributions	to	the	F-
150 were alternators, antitheft devices, axles, fuel tanks, headlamps, 
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from Automotive	News (2006).
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instrument panels, pumps, radiators, sound systems, and windshields. 
In	2004,	Visteon	was	the	second-largest	parts	maker	in	North	America,	
with	$11	billion	in	sales	for	new	vehicles.	Visteon	was	not	the	F-150’s	




together at arguably the most venerable assembly plant in the country, 
Ford’s	Rouge	complex	in	Dearborn,	Michigan.	At	its	height	of	impor-
tance between the two world wars, the Rouge complex employed more 




















































































than 100,000 workers in more than 100 buildings. Raw materials fa-
mously	arrived	at	one	end	and	finished	vehicles	rolled	out	at	the	other.	
Ford’s	twenty-first-century	Rouge	assembly	plant	bears	little	physical	
resemblance to the mid-twentieth-century version. A display in the 
Rouge visitor center illustrates how much the complex had changed. 
Yet the plant continued to be a major reason why Michigan was still the 
leading	car-producing	state	in	the	early	twenty-first	century.
Meanwhile, 300 miles south, Toyota was assembling most of its 
Camrys	in	Georgetown,	Kentucky,	previously	best	known	for	a	small	
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from Automotive	News (2006).
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college that hosted the Cincinnati Bengals preseason camp. Toyota de-
liberately chose to build a campus with nearly 10,000 employees in 




Where vehicles are assembled affects where parts are made. Some 
parts are made right next door to the assembly plants, and some are 
made on the other side of the world. In the context of just-in-time pro-
duction, however, we show that most parts are made within a several-
hundred-mile radius of the assembly plant in which they are used. Thus, 
most	of	the	F-150	parts	are	made	within	several	hundred	miles	of	the	
Rouge, and most of the Camry parts are made within several hundred 
miles	of	Georgetown.	
DATA FOR THIS BOOK
The	first	challenge	in	writing	about	parts	suppliers	is	actually	find-




This study’s database, in contrast, has been built by aggregating 
observations from several thousand individual parts plants in the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico. A large number of variables have been 
collected for every factory operated by the 150 largest North American 
suppliers, as well as more than a thousand smaller companies. Together, 
these plants account for the overwhelming majority of parts production 
in North America, probably well over 90 percent.
One hundred percent coverage cannot be claimed for the database. 
Information may be incorrect for particular plants, and some plants un-
doubtedly have been missed altogether. But this is by far the most com-
prehensive and detailed compilation of data on parts suppliers in North 
America, making it possible to identify trends and draw conclusions at 
a higher level of detail than is possible with summary data.2 
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Government Data Sources
The primary government data source is the U.S. Census of Man-
ufactures,	 collected	 every	 five	 years,	 including	 1997	 and	 2002.	 The	
Census of Manufactures provides information about both the value of 
shipments originating from manufacturing establishments and the value 
added at manufacturing establishments in each sector of the economy. 
The census also provides information on employees, payroll, produc-
tion workers, wages, cost of materials, and capital expenditures.
Motor vehicle assembly operations are allocated to North American 
Industrial	Classification	System	(NAICS)	code	3361.	NAICS	3361	is	
divided into three six-digit codes: NAICS 336111 for automobile manu-
facturing	(i.e.,	final	assembly),	NAICS	336112	for	light	truck	manufac-




The manufacture of many motor vehicle parts is assigned to NAICS 
3363, which is divided into eight six-digit codes: engines, electrical, 
steering & suspension, brakes, transmissions, fabrics & seats, metal 
stampings, and other. We also include NAICS 336211, motor vehicle 









336330, 336340 Chassis 23.6 9.5
336320 Electronics 25.7 4.0
336370, 336211 Exterior 32.9 11.9
336360 Interior 17.2 19.1
336310, 336350 Powertrain 70.5 42.9
336390 Other 41.4 6.6
Total 211.3 Unknown
— Other NAICS codes Unknown Unknown
— Total value of parts Unknown 156.2
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Census of Manufactures.
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bodies,	in	our	definition	of	motor	vehicle	parts.	The	value	of	shipments	
for NAICS codes 3363 and 336211, motor vehicle parts and motor ve-
hicle	bodies,	in	2002	was	$211.3	billion.	The	six-digit	NAICS	codes	are	
subdivided	into	more	detailed	eight-	and	10-digit	codes.	For	example,	
transmissions (NAICS 336350) is divided into transmissions for new 
vehicles (NAICS 33635011), transmissions for heavy trucks and buses 
(NAICS 33635012), transmission parts (NAICS 33635013), axles (NA-
ICS 33635014), and other drivetrain parts (NAICS 33635015). NAICS 
33635015 in turn is divided into seven 10-digit codes, such as clutches 
(NAICS 3363501522) and drive shafts (NAICS 3363501528). 
The large discrepancy between the value of deliveries and the value 
of shipments, as well as the large size of “other” categories, points to 
three	serious	limitations	of	NAICS	data.	First,	shipments	include	both	
original equipment and aftermarket sales. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, an estimated 30 percent of shipments go to the aftermarket, al-
though	precise	figures	are	not	available	from	the	census	and	percentages	
are likely to vary among NAICS codes. Second, deliveries include both 
domestic-made and foreign-made parts. As discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 13, at the time of the 2002 census, roughly one-fourth of parts 
arriving at U.S. assembly plants were produced in other countries.
The third critical limitation, affecting both shipments and deliver-
ies, is that some key parts, including tires, glass, and paint, have been 
placed in NAICS codes other than 3363 if their primary customers are 
outside the motor vehicle industry. Consequently, it is not possible, us-
ing census data, to break out values on the shipments of these parts to 
vehicle assembly plants. 
This Study’s Database
Rather than relying predominantly on aggregated government data, 
research for this book included creating a database of several thousand 
parts plants by name and address. The starting point for the plant-level 
database was information acquired from ELM International, Inc., a 
Michigan-based vendor of information about automotive suppliers.3
Although it was not designed with research applications in mind, 
the ELM International database purports to offer exhaustive coverage, 
with 4,268 plant-level records in 2006, covering the United States, Can-
ada, and Mexico. Additional records are continuously added. Informa-
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tion about individual plants includes name, address, products made at 





industry in recent years. 
The second revision concerned employment level. Plants shown by 
ELM International to have more than 2,000 employees were checked 
either by phone or a review of the company Web site. Employment 
figures	reported	in	the	ELM	International	database	for	2006	averaged	
about	 one-fourth	 higher	 than	 the	 field-checked	 employment	 figures.	
Consequently,	 employment	 figures	 based	 on	 ELM	 International	 data	
were not used in this study unless they were found to be in substantial 
agreement with other sources.
We also added plants that should have been included by ELM In-
ternational to the database and removed others that had closed. Every 
plant operated in the United States in 2006 by the 150 largest parts 
suppliers, according to Automotive	News	(2007a),	was	identified,	rep-
resenting a total of approximately 1,600 plants. There was a net of 335 
plants added to the ELM International database, approximately a 20 
percent increase. 
Fourth,	we	collected	additional	information	about	the	4,268	plants	
in the database beyond that provided by ELM International. The age 
of the plant and the nationality of the owner were found for most of 
the plants through contacting the companies or reviewing state indus-
trial directories, press reports, and trade associations (e.g., the Japan 
Auto Parts Industries Association). The latitude and longitude of each 
plant location was geocoded to facilitate mapping of plant distribu-
tions, which was especially important for the geographic analysis found 
throughout this book.
The	final	significant	 revision	was	 to	 identify	one	primary	 type	of	
part for each of the 4,268 plants. The ELM International database listed 
up to 13 distinct parts being made at a particular plant; only 1,551 plants 
had only 1 parts code, 37 had at least 10 parts codes, and 4 plants had 
the maximum 13. The mean number of parts codes per plant was about 
2.4.	For	 this	book,	we	assigned	each	plant	one	of	six	codes:	chassis,	
electronic, exterior, interior, generic, and powertrain.
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The principal limitation of the database that could not be overcome 
concerned the customers for each plant. The database showed the names 
of the carmakers to which the parts were ultimately attached, but it rare-
ly listed the name of the immediate customer, which in many cases 
would be another supplier. In other words, most suppliers of seat parts, 
for example, reported their customer to be a carmaker even though the 
seat parts were actually shipped to a seat assembler.
Key	findings	of	the	database	included:
• Number of plants: 3,179 plants were located in the United States, 
plus	416	in	Canada	and	673	in	Mexico	(see	Figure	1.3).
• Type of owner: 3 percent of the U.S. parts plants were owned by 
carmakers; 42 percent by the 150 largest suppliers, each with an-
nual	North	American	original	equipment	sales	of	more	than	$200	
million; and 55 percent by 1,000 other suppliers.
• Plant size: Median plant employment was 220, mean was 350, 
and 6 percent had more than 1,000 employees.
• Nationality of owner: 77 percent were owned by companies with 
U.S. headquarters and 23 percent by companies with foreign 
headquarters.
• Date of opening: 55 percent were opened before 1980 and 45 
percent between 1980 and 2006.
• Location: 25 percent were located in Michigan, 36 percent in 
other	Great	Lakes	states,	28	percent	in	the	South,	and	11	percent	
in the rest of the country.
• Union: 85 percent of the plants reported on their union status: 30 
percent had a union and 70 percent did not.
• Type of part: 22 percent of plants made parts for the powertrain, 
including the engine and transmission; 19 percent of plants made 
parts for the chassis, including tires, wheels, brakes, steering, and 
suspension; 15 percent of plants made parts for the exterior, in-
cluding bodies, bumpers, glass, and paint; 14 percent of plants 
made parts for the interior, including seats, instrument panels, 
doors, headliners, and carpeting; 15 percent of plants made parts 
for the electronic systems, including engine management, pas-
senger convenience, and safety; and 16 percent of plants made 
generic parts, including bearings, brackets, and hinges.
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Compared with supplier studies by the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
Center for Automotive Research (CAR), and Merrill Lynch, this study 
has found a smaller percentage of powertrain plants and a larger per-
centage of chassis plants (Table 1.3). The difference can most likely 
be	attributed	to	differences	in	allocating	parts	among	systems.	For	ex-
ample, should the axle be considered part of the powertrain or part of 
the chassis?
BOOK OUTLINE
The book is divided into four sections, based on impacts of chang-
ing carmaker–supplier relationships at various geographic scales:
• Part I: The motor vehicle industry’s traditional core region cen-
Figure 1.3  Parts and Assembly Plants in North America
SOURCE: Adapted by the authors from Ward’s	Automotive	Yearbook, ELM Interna-
tional, and other sources.
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tered on southeastern Michigan and adjacent Midwest states near 
the	southern	Great	Lakes.	Which	parts	are	still	being	made	in	the	
industry’s traditional home and why? 
• Part II: Local-scale connections between carmakers and their 
suppliers. Which parts are being made very close to their cus-
tomer—a	final	assembly	plant—and	how	are	the	rest	of	the	parts	
being moved from supplier to customer? 
• Part III: Clustering of motor vehicle production at the regional 
scale, known as Auto Alley. Why have most suppliers located 
in Auto Alley, and what factors account for choice of location 
within Auto Alley?
•	 Part	 IV:	 International	shifts	 in	production	of	parts	 for	 the	U.S.	
motor vehicle industry. What is the magnitude and rate of growth 
of the outsourcing of parts to other countries, and which of 
the many parts in a motor vehicle are the ones being sourced 
overseas?
CARMAKER–SUPPLIER RELATIONS
Manufacture of original equipment parts constitutes an intermedi-
ate step in the process of producing motor vehicles. As a result, the 
Table 1.3  Percent Vehicle Content by System
System 












Powertrain 22 26 27 33 40 36
Chassis 19 22 9 11 15 18
Electronics 15 17 21 25 11 18
Exterior 15 18 19 23 16 19
Interior 14 17 6 8 18 10
Generic 16 18
NOTE: Columns may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
SOURCE: McAlinden and Andrea (2002); Merrill Lynch (2007).  
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fortunes of the producers of the parts depend to a large extent on their 
ultimate customers, the carmakers. A book on motor vehicle parts sup-
pliers therefore must acknowledge the perspective of carmakers. In this 
section,	we	briefly	review	changes	in	the	role	of	parts	makers	from	the	
carmaker’s perspective, as well as the literature on relationships be-
tween carmakers and parts suppliers.
The	“Big	3”	carmakers	(GM,	Ford,	and	Chrysler)	dominated	twen-
tieth-century	production,	but	 they	entered	 the	 twenty-first	 century	on	
very shaky ground. Their U.S. market share plunged from 95 percent in 
the mid-twentieth century to 75 percent in the late twentieth century to 
50	percent	in	the	first	decade	of	the	twenty-first	century.	Ford	and	GM	




tury as the “Detroit 3.”
As the Detroit 3 struggled, Japanese-based companies led by Toyota 
were	raking	in	record	profits	and	market	share.	Foreign-owned	carmak-





to lead world production since the nineteenth century. 
Toyota’s success was based on its distinctive production system 
that	efficiently	 turned	out	vehicles	nearly	free	of	defects.	The	Toyota	
Production System has many key elements, and often underappreciated 
among them is a distinctive relationship between the carmaker and its 
suppliers. “At least part of Toyota’s success is because of its harmoni-
ous relationship with supplier companies.”4 
In	a	fiercely	cutthroat	market,	 the	 relationship	with	 suppliers	has	
become a key source of competitive advantage for some carmakers. 
As	Toyota	passed	Ford	and	then	GM	as	the	world’s	largest	carmaker,	
favorable supplier relations contributed to its success. “The automaker 
thinks it can gain a competitive advantage in North America if suppli-
ers	 are	 satisfied	 by	 their	 relationship	with	 the	 automaker”	 (Chappell	
2005b).
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Benefits of Good Carmaker–Supplier Relations
Researchers have been especially interested in documenting and ex-
plaining the competitive advantage accruing to carmakers as a result of 
good supplier relations. The seminal study The	Machine	That	Changed	
the	 World	 by	 the	 International	Motor	 Vehicle	 Program	 based	 at	 the	
Massachusetts Institute of Technology introduced many in the U.S. 
auto industry to the successes of Japanese-inspired lean production, in-
cluding the different relationships between carmakers and suppliers as 
compared with the U.S. model (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990).
Research on changing relations between carmakers and their suppli-
ers has emanated from two types of scholars. Analysts in nonacademic 
settings have measured the magnitude of the parts industry and have 
documented the enhanced role of suppliers in the production process. 
Academic researchers have emphasized the underlying meaning and 
significance	of	changing	carmaker–supplier	relations	and	the	compara-
tive advantage that accrues to some carmakers through enhanced sup-
plier relations.
Most of the recent studies on the motor vehicle parts sector have 
come from analysts in nonacademic settings. Researchers are based in 
three	types	of	organizations:	auto	industry	specialists,	financial	services	
firms,	and	government	agencies.	Described	below	are	some	of	the	stud-
ies that industry specialists have released to the public.
The	CAR	Economics	and	Business	Group	has	addressed	changing	
relationships between carmakers and suppliers in numerous studies. 
CAR researchers have estimated the total number of jobs generated by 
the auto industry in the United States and in selected states (Hill 2005; 
Hill, Menk, and Szakaly 2007), the future size of union membership 
and the Detroit 3 workforce (McAlinden 2007), and a “stay/go” index 
to forecast the likelihood that production of particular types of parts will 
abandon Michigan (McAlinden 2006). 
DesRosiers Automotive Consultants has estimated the magnitude 
of the supplier sector in North America and the likelihood of increased 
overseas	outsourcing	 (DesRosiers	2005,	2006).	The	firm	is	Canadian	
based, so it breaks out U.S. and Canadian data.
The Original Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA), represent-
ing the perspective of the leading parts makers in North America, has 
documented	the	difficulties	faced	by	suppliers,	especially	in	the	context	
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of the global economy. OESA has also described the increasing role of 
equity	investment	firms	in	the	parts	supplier	industry	(De	Koker	2006;	
Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association 2007; Original Equip-
ment Suppliers Association 2006).
CSM Worldwide has specialized in forecasting future demand for 
vehicles and parts, with a worldwide focus (Robinet 2005). Roland 
Berger Strategy Consultants has also concentrated on future worldwide 
trends in demand for different parts, especially in view of technology 
changes	(Maj,	Benecchi,	and	van	Acker	2004).	The	McKinsey	Global	
Institute within McKinsey & Company has documented productivity 
improvements in the motor vehicle industry (Baily et al. 2005). IRN, 
a Michigan-based consultancy, focuses on auto supplier issues (Korth 
2007).
Studies on the motor vehicle parts sector have also been produced 
by agencies of the federal government. The U.S. Department of Com-
merce	Office	of	Aerospace	and	Automotive	Industries	publishes	an	an-
nual assessment of the parts industry.5 Reports on aspects of the auto 






a result of changing relations with carmakers (see, for example, Stein-
metz 2006). Merrill Lynch has monitored the supplier sector with an 
eye to recommending companies for investment (Merrill Lynch 2007); 
the	 firm	 has	 also	 looked	 at	 future	 energy	 technology	 (Merrill	 Lynch	
2006).
Elements of Changing Carmaker–Supplier Relations
The shift from parts and components to modules and systems has 
fundamentally changed the role of parts suppliers in the development 
and production of cars. Analysts agree on the following basic dimen-
sions of change (Wasti and Liker 1999).
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Fewer parts and more modules
What goes into a vehicle can be sorted into the following hierarchy:
• Parts are typically small, individual pieces of metal, rubber, or 
plastic stamped, cut, or molded into distinctive shapes, such as 
knobs and levers.
• Components are several parts put together into recognizable fea-
tures, such as radios and seat covers.
• Modules are several components combined to make functional 
portions of a motor vehicle, such as instrument panels and seats. 
• Systems are groups of components that are linked by function into 
major units of motor vehicles, such as interiors and engines.
In	 the	 past	 at	 their	 final	 assembly	 plants,	 carmakers	 gathered	 to-
gether thousands of individual parts and components purchased either 
from independent suppliers or made by their own parts divisions. Now, 
suppliers are being asked to deliver large modules and systems ready to 
be	installed	on	the	final	assembly	line.	“A	modular	system	is	composed	
of subsystems (or modules) that are designed independently but still 
function as an integrated whole” (Dyer 2000, p. 171). Modularization 
was	described	by	GM	vice	president	Bob	Lutz	as	“like	the	definition	of	
a Lego set” (Mackintosh 2004). 
“What was once a highly vertically integrated industry has become 
ever	more	dependent	on	supplier	companies	to	fulfill	increasingly	com-
plex piece and module design and production” (Hill, Menk, and Szakaly 
2007, p. 9). As a result, some analysts speculate that “[m]odularization 
may remove the nameplate assembler from directly manufacturing 
much of the product; it becomes rather the marketer, coordinator and 
distributor	of	the	final	vehicle”	(Cooney	and	Yacobucci	2005,	p.	41).	
SupplierBusiness.com (2004) described the difference between a 
module and a system this way: “[T]he different parts of a safety system 
or a braking and traction control system are located in separate areas 
of the vehicle and incorporated into several different modules, but they 
will have been designed to work together as a complete system . . . 
[M]odules are being designed as complex units, which incorporate 
multiple functions. Examples of modules include seats, doors, cockpits, 
front-ends and suspension corner modules. Each of these can include 
components from two or more major vehicle systems.”
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A	parts	producer	stated	the	difference	more	flippantly:	“Two	parts	
bolted together is a module. Three parts bolted together is a system.”6
Larger contracts to fewer suppliers
Instead of buying from thousands of suppliers, carmakers are of-
fering large contracts to only a handful of suppliers, which are con-
solidating	into	fewer	larger	firms	and	driving	smaller	firms	out	of	the	
industry.
“Productivity improvements and the declining market share of do-
mestic OEMs have led to considerable consolidation among motor ve-
hicle parts suppliers” (Hill, Menk, and Szakaly 2007, p. 10). “Since the 
early 1990s . . . the largest 20–30 suppliers in the industry have taken on 
a much larger role in the areas of design, production, and foreign invest-
ment, shifting the balance of power in some small measure away from 
lead	firms	towards	suppliers”	(Sturgeon,	Van	Biesebroeck,	and	Gereffi	
2007, p. 3). As a result, “[w]hile the total number of vehicles produced 
in North America grew by 40 percent between 1991 and 2005—from 
11.6 million to 16.3 million—the combined sales of the largest 150 sup-
pliers in North America almost tripled over the same time period . . .” 
(Hill, Menk, and Szakaly 2007, p. 24).
Longer relationships between suppliers and carmakers
Instead of awarding contracts annually to the lowest price bidders, 
carmakers are developing long-term relationships with suppliers, at 
least	for	the	several-year	life	of	specific	vehicle	models,	if	not	longer.	
“The continued efforts by original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) to reduce costs has led to an ever-increasing amount of manu-
facturing, sub-assembly, and R&D work being shifted to suppliers . . . 
The supplier companies design, engineer and manufacture the vast ma-
jority of the parts that go into a modern-day motor vehicle” (Hill, Menk, 
and	Szakaly	2007,	pp.	1,	9).	“For	niche	vehicles	or	 low-volume	cars	
the entire assembly is sometimes turned over to an outside contractor. 
The practice allows OEMs to assemble vehicles locally without large 
capital investments or to increase production capacity when their own 
assembly plants cannot satisfy demand for an unexpectedly successful 
model”	(Van	Biesebroeck	2006,	p.	210).
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More research and development by suppliers
Instead	of	providing	detailed	specifications,	carmakers	are	giving	
suppliers responsibility for research and development to design and 
build innovative modules and systems.
In	2000,	suppliers	spent	$6.6	billion	on	research	and	product	devel-
opment, accounting for 36 percent of total automotive-related spending 
on	 research	 and	development;	 this	 increased	 to	 $6.8	 billion	 in	 2003,	
or 40 percent of all research and product development spending (Hill, 
Menk, and Szakaly 2007). “Most innovations in safety, emissions, and 
entertainment come from Tier 1 suppliers.”7 “Some suppliers are will-
ingly taking on the new responsibilities offered to them by the OEMs, 
transforming themselves into ‘Tier One-Half systems integrators,’ that 
engineer and build complete modules (for example, an entire interior, 
4-corner suspension sets, or an entire rolling chassis) and assume both 
product design and development responsibilities and down stream sup-
ply chain management functions previously undertaken by the OEMs” 
(Office	of	Aerospace	and	Automotive	Industries	2007,	p.	6).	
Smaller parts inventory and more just-in-time delivery
Instead of maintaining a large inventory of parts, carmakers are re-
quiring suppliers to deliver modules and systems on a just-in-time (JIT) 
basis,	often	within	only	a	few	minutes	before	needed	on	the	final	as-
sembly line. 
“Because	 there	 is	 no	 built	 up	 inventory,	 JIT	 allows	 the	 firms	 to	
correct quality problems as they are discovered, and to make running 
changes	in	product	specifications	or	volume	requirements	when	need-
ed”	(Office	of	Aerospace	and	Automotive	Industries	2007,	p.	5).
Two Paradigms for Carmaker–Supplier Relations
Researchers argue that an automaker’s strong relationships to its 
supply	base	can	be	a	valuable	strategic	capability	that	is	difficult	and	
time-consuming for competitors to imitate. According to Jeffrey Dyer 
(2000, p. 169), “competitive advantage will increasingly be jointly cre-
ated,	and	shared,	by	teams	of	firms	within	a	value	chain.”
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Analysts’ perspectives on Japanese carmaker–supplier relations 
Japanese carmakers have established constructive partnerships 
with their suppliers. A key to better supplier relations is trust. The three 
leading Japanese carmakers, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan, are seen as 
legitimate semi-insiders by supplier companies (Sako 2004, p. 301): 
“Suppliers’ trust of (Japanese carmakers) lay in the latter’s competence 
as	teachers,	but	also	in	devising	a	clear	set	of	rules	for	sharing	specific	
gains from short-term intervention, and for letting suppliers appropriate 
wider gains from long-term capability enhancement.”
According to Wasti and Liker (1999), positive supplier relation-
ships are achieved by following six steps: 1) understand how suppliers 
work, 2) turn supplier rivalry into opportunity, 3) supervise vendors, 
4) develop supplier technical capabilities, 5) share information inten-
sively but selectively, and 6) conduct joint improvement activities.
From	 interviews	with	nearly	100	managers	 at	Honda	and	Toyota	
as well as their suppliers, Liker and Choi ([2004]; see also Dyer and 
Nobeoka [2000]) concluded that these two carmakers “have struck re-
markable partnerships with some of the same suppliers that are at log-
gerheads with the Big Three and have created latter-day keiretsu across 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico . . . Toyota and Honda have 
managed to replicate in an alien Western culture the same kind of sup-
plier webs they built in Japan.” (Keiretsu	is	defined	on	p.	22.)




suppliers are able to develop technologies that give their customers an 
advantage” (Automotive	News 2005a). Japanese carmakers have nursed 
their suppliers, and suppliers like doing business with them. In addition, 
supplier networks incorporate a complex system of incentives.
The three leading Japanese carmakers do not have identical supplier 
relations (Sako 2004). Although all three transfer knowledge to suppli-
ers through a variety of development activities and management control 
systems, Toyota shares more information with suppliers and has more 
separation between purchasing and engineering development. “[Each 
of the three Japanese carmakers] clearly distinguishes between the in-
ner core of suppliers to which processes for ‘capability enhancement’ 
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are taught in a hands-on manner, and the rest, who are mainly given 
incentives to make improvements through long-term customer commit-
ment. This distinction ensures that tacit knowledge is shared only with 
the inner core. This inner core ranges from 25 companies at Nissan and 
52 at Toyota, and up to 63 at Honda” (Sako 2004, p. 302).
Analysts’ perspectives on Detroit 3–supplier relations 
In contrast, Sako and Helper surveyed 675 Tier 1 suppliers in the 
United States and 472 in Japan during the 1990s and found that “[t]he 
U.S. auto industry has been characterized by decades of adversarial 
buyer-supplier relations” (Mudambi and Helper 1998, p. 789). They 
also state that “suppliers to the U.S. automobile industry have little ex-
pectation of being treated fairly by their customers” (p. 776). Table 1.4 
summarizes the contrast between the two models of supplier relations. 
“Experts agree that American corporations, like their Japanese ri-
vals, should build supplier keiretsu: close-knit networks of vendors 
Table 1.4  Relationships between Suppliers and U.S. and Japanese 
Carmakers 
Criteria Detroit 3a Japanese 3b 
Relationship orientation Adversarial; focus is on 








and late information 
High level and timely 
Protect	confidential	
information
Little regard for suppliers’ 
proprietary information or 
intellectual property 
High regard 
Importance of cost vs. 
quality and technology 
By far, primary focus is on 
cost 
Also seek low cost but 
balance it with quality 
improvements and 
technology 
Supplier survival Little regard Concern for long-term 
success and stability 
a	GM,	Ford,	and	Chrysler.	
b Toyota, Honda, and Nissan.
SOURCE: PPI (2005).
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that continuously learn, improve, and prosper along with their parent 
companies” (Liker and Choi 2004, p. 106). The key word in the previ-
ous sentence is should, because the reality is that “current attempts to 
increase informal commitment and trust are constrained by the exis-
tence of adversarial buyer-supplier relations in the past” (Mudambi and 
Helper 1998, p. 776).
U.S. carmakers have tried going down the path of cooperation. Dur-
ing the early 1990s, for example, Chrysler implemented a more coop-
erative way of doing business with its suppliers that showed almost 
immediate improvements in its supplier relationships. In the wake of its 
merger with Daimler, however, that approach was abandoned in favor 
of the traditional way of doing business.8
Mudambi and Helper (1998, p. 789) concluded that relationships 
between U.S. carmakers and suppliers are close even though they are 
adversarial: “[T]he close but adversarial model represents the current 
state of buyer-supplier relations in the majority of cases.” U.S. carmak-
ers have created a framework of formal cooperation with their suppli-
ers, but it is accompanied by uncooperative behavior. U.S. carmakers 
take advantage of the competitive weaknesses of suppliers to reap 
short-term gain (Mudambi and Helper 1998). Especially damning was 
the perspective of U.S. suppliers, which were less trusting than Japa-
nese suppliers, except when they had Japanese carmakers as customers 
(Sako and Helper 1998).
Liker and Choi (2004) show that U.S. carmakers have adopted all of 
the Japanese-inspired organizational strategies, including slashing the 
number of suppliers, awarding long-term contracts to the survivors, en-
couraging Tier 1 suppliers to set up lower-tier networks, ordering sys-
tems and modules instead of parts and components, receiving deliveries 
on a just-in-time basis, and giving suppliers responsibility for quality 
and costs. “However, while these American companies created supply 
chains	that	superficially	resembled	those	of	their	Japanese	competitors,	
they didn’t alter the fundamental nature of their relationships with sup-
pliers. It wasn’t long into the partnering movement before manufactur-
ers	and	suppliers	were	fighting	bitterly	over	the	implementation	of	best	
practices, like continuous quality improvement and annual price reduc-
tions” (Liker and Choi 2004, p. 106).
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Carmaker–Supplier Relations: Converging or Diverging?
Helper and Sako (1995) did detect some convergence in the way 
U.S. and Japanese carmakers work with suppliers. 
• Information disclosure. The percentage of suppliers reporting 
an increase in information disclosed by U.S. carmakers rose from 
38 percent in 1984 and 50 percent in 1989 to 80 percent in 1993; 
the percentage of suppliers reporting an increase in information 
disclosed by Japanese carmakers declined from 80 percent in 
1989 to 77 percent in 1993.
• Joint problem-solving. The percentage of suppliers report-
ing that U.S. carmakers helped them match efforts by compet-
ing suppliers increased from 32 percent in 1989 to 51 percent 
in 1993; the percentage of suppliers reporting that Japanese car-
makers helped them match competitors declined from 45 percent 
in 1989 to 40 percent in 1993.
• Contract length. Suppliers to U.S. carmakers reported that the 
average contract increased from 1.2 years in 1984 to 2.3 years in 
1989 and 2.4 years in 1993; two-thirds of suppliers to Japanese 
carmakers	reported	no	time-specific	contracts.
The immense cost pressures faced by the Detroit 3 have since 
pushed the pendulum in the other direction and again made cost the 
main	criterion	in	supplier	selection.	First,	the	Detroit	3	carmakers	have	
been more easily able to source globally, notably from China. As a re-
sult, many North American suppliers now have to compete with the 
“landed costs” of parts produced in China and other low-wage coun-
tries. Second, Internet-based technologies have allowed the Detroit 3 
to	get	 suppliers	 to	 compete	on	 cost	more	 efficiently—and	more	bru-
tally—than they used to. Confrontational tactics of Detroit 3 purchasers 
include “beat[ing] down prices with electronic auctions or rebidding 
work to a competitor. Japanese are equally tough on price but are com-
mitted to maintaining supplier continuity” (Chappell 2004a; Sherefkin 
and Wilson 2003). Consequently, the relations between carmakers and 
suppliers in America have deteriorated even as the quality of vehicles 
has improved (Liker and Choi 2004). According to Stallkamp (2005b), 
“Typically, in any one of the Big Three automakers there might be more 
than 250 to 300 buyers working at one time, each responsible for man-
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aging a small aspect of the parts or services that go into the vehicle.” 
Isolated from engineering, manufacturing, and marketing people, these 
buyers have been motivated primarily by the desire to reduce the piece 
or unit price. A penny per part adds up to big savings for a buyer. 
Detroit	3	financial	monitors	have	further	increased	pressure	on	sup-
pliers through “open book pricing,” such as auditing quotes and review-
ing overhead expenses. “What happens is the big guys, major OEMs, 
keep putting more and more requirements on the supplier that are non-
negotiable. They simply say, ‘This is the way it is going to be done as of 
this date, and next year we want another 5 percent price reduction.’”9
In response, Stallkamp (2005b) suggests that suppliers have en-
gaged in an elaborate game:
The	supply	base	participants	quickly	figured	out	that	a	low	quote	
was the major deciding factor and often bid at cost or even below 
cost	to	secure	the	business.	They	recovered	their	profits	over	time	
because the development process each of the U.S. companies used 
was so lengthy and convoluted that each part was changed several 
times, each time providing a chance for the supplier to increase 
its price for the design change. Suppliers often padded these de-
sign changes, but because the business was based on the initial 
quote, little was done to move to another supplier because switch-
ing would cost time, cause disruption and possibly produce quality 
issues. 
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
“Industry surveys consistently have shown the U.S. component 
supplier segment to be mistrustful, resentful and rebellious against their 
Big 3 customers, while favorable to the Japanese transplants such as 
Toyota and Honda” (Chappell 2005b). One such survey of carmaker– 
supplier relationships has been conducted annually since 2000 by Plan-
ning	Perspectives	Inc.	(PPI).	From	the	responses	of	more	than	200	sup-
pliers, PPI (2005) constructed a Working Relations Index to measure 
how carmakers treat their suppliers on the basis of 17 business prac-
tices. According to a 2007 PPI survey of 308 North American parts 
makers, including 69 of the 150 largest, Toyota was ranked highest in 
26   Klier and Rubenstein
fostering positive business relationships, followed by Honda, Nissan, 
Chrysler,	GM,	and	Ford	(PPI	2007;	Table	1.5).
Why do supplier relations matter? Because good relationships to 
the supply base have become a key element of some carmakers’ busi-
ness	strategies.	“For	the	Big	3,	the	danger	is	that	suppliers	may	stop	of-
fering them their best technology” (Automotive	News 2005b). Suppliers 
say they have reduced spending on research and development for the 
Detroit 3 and increased it for Japanese carmakers. More mistrustful of 
Detroit 3 business methods, suppliers have been less willing to share 
technology with them or invest in their products as compared with Japa-
nese carmakers (Chappell 2004b). 
Larry Denton, CEO of Dura Automotive Systems, summarized the 
situation in Sherefkin and Wilson (2003): “Catalytic converters, ABS, 
airbags, automatic transmissions, safety belts—those were all innova-
tions that came from the traditional Big 3. We can’t name anything like 
that	 that	 has	 come	 in	 the	 last	 five	 years	 because	 if	 I	 look	 at	 iDrive,	
advanced	diesel	engines,	hybrids,	CVT—where	did	they	come	from?	
There’s something broke here. Innovation isn’t getting through the old 
domestics . . . Even though we’re all suppliers to all of them, technol-
ogy is headed in one direction because of the business model, and it 
needs	to	be	fixed.”	





% changeCarmaker 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Toyota 314 334 399 415 407 415 2.0 32.2 
Honda 297 316 384 375 368 380  3.3 27.9
Nissan 227 259 294 298 300 289 −3.7 27.3
Chrysler 175 177 183 196 218 199 −8.7 13.7
Ford	 167 161 160 157 174 162 −6.9 −3.0
GM	 161 156 144 114 131 174 32.8 8.1
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